The end of the Cold War markcd a radical change in the world order. In the ncw era, the globalisation is the main force affecting policies and actions of the vvorld states. The domination of the West (especially the US) över the vvorld politics is much more evident. The other states of the vvorld are prone to the intervention of the majör povvers. While the vvorld goes through a radical change, Turkish leaders have chosen to be on the side of the founders of the nevv order, that is the US, as they exactly did in the aftermath of the Second World War. There is no one distinet common threat novv facing the alliance in vvhich Turkey is a member, but Turkish rulers stili feel surrounded by threats. The Turkish economy is much stronger compared vvith its situation in the Cold War period, but entering into a balanced economic cooperation vvith the US and the EU has a great importance for Turkey in order to be able to compete vvith the other povvers in an era in vvhich the globalisation is the dominant force. The West is stili the most important source for Turkey in getting high-tech military equipment, but it seems that the conditions of obtaining them vvill not be as suitable as it vvas in the past. Turkey also needs to make changes in its domcstic system in accordance vvith global values in order not to stay outside the West. In short, Turkey goes through the process of participating in the nevv vvorld system as a more aetive actor. its relationship vvith the US, vvhich constitutcs the most important aspect of its foreign policy, is affcctcd by this process as much as it influcnces it. This article analyses the factors behind this interaetion.
Turkey's New Environment
It will be easier to comprehend Turkish-American relations if the present conditions surrounding Turkey are described briefly. Her proximity to the trouble spots of the new world order has made Turkey the frontline country of NATO, putting her in the epicentre of the new international environment.
1 With the outbreak of regional conflicts, Turkey's position as an island of stability in the centre of volatile region, as a barrier against the outbreak and spread of these local wars and as a promoter of regional cooperation has gained more importance. 2 These developments have also helped Turkey to gain a weight in regional and world politics with its increased physical and strategic strength. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has terminated the majör security threat for Turkey and vveakened her regional rivals such as Syria, Iran and Iraq, thus relieving its foreign and security policies from certain constraints. Moreover, the factors such as the revival of Turkey's cultural, linguistic and historical ties with "the vast land mass of Eurasia" extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus has broadened the scope of Turkish foreign policy and opened up new areas for Turkish economic and political activities.
In Gürel's words, Turkey has passed through a unique period that has forced Turkish rulers to observe "simultaneously developments on several fronts, ranging from the process of European integration to the emergence of a belt of countries of Turkic language in the Caucasus and Central Asia, from tragic developments in the Balkans to the instability and conflict in the Middle East and the Caucasus." 4 Turkey is surrounded by the most unstable, uncertain and unpredictable regions and it is one of the most exposed states to dangers of the new security environment. 5 Although it stili remains wary of the developments on her bordcrs with the former Soviet Union, Turkey's strategic priorities shiftcd toward the new dangers in the south, including those originated from the activities of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Kurdish terrorists. 6 Among the potential threats pcrceived by Turkish rulers were the religious radicalism; the spread of terrorism; the ethnic nationalism; the proliferation of nuclcar vveapons and other weapons of mass destruction in its region; regional rivalries and hegemonic aspirations; instabilities emanating from mass migration, civil breakdovvns, ete.; the loss of prestige and credibility of international institutions; and the possibility of disruption of Middle Eastern oil flows. 7 Apart from being left out of the emerging European security struetures, Turkish rulers have also fearcd from the establishment of dcfence cooperation and alliance 4 Gürel, "A General Appraisal...", p. 12. relations between Turkey's regional rivals and enemies. Especially Greek altempts to encircle Turkey with bilateral and multilateral relationships have alarmed Turkish leaders to search for balancing alternatives. 8 Each of Turkey's hostilc neighbours has no power to thrcaten her with individual aggression, but they may cause problems for Turkey vvhen they act together. 9 Turkish leaders at least have to consider the possibility of conducting military operations in tvvo fronts in case of a regional conflict, and to direct their sources in conformity of this possibility.
Turkey's Current Problems and the USA

Decrease in Strategic Importance
The vvarming of East-Wcst relations vvith the end of the Cold War brought about the possibility of Turkey's becoming "a leading casualty of strategic negleet" in the nevv era. This vvas a serious setback for it bccause a decrcase in Turkey's stratcgic importance vvas likely to result in less Wcstern economic and military assistance and a harsher attitude tovvard Turkey. Staying outside the Westcrn political economic, cultural and security slructures vvould mean the failure of Turkish traditional foreign policy and its Western-type political system. With the outbrcak of the Gulf War, it vvas believed that Turkey regained its strategic importance. Hovvever, some factors such as the Westcrn conciliatory attitude tovvard Russia and ı;he European intention of lcaving Turkey outside the European Community (EC) and the Wcstern European Union (WEU) stili keept Turkish rulers vigilant. 10 The fact that America has been insistent on Turkey's strategic importance for the West keept Turkish-Amcrican relations on a sound track and lcd Turkish rulers to bc more inclined tovvard the USA rather than the Western Europe. 8 Mufti, "Daring and Caution...", pp. 35-36, 37, 40. 9 Şadi Ergüvenç, "Turkey's Stratcgic importance in Military Dimension: A Regional Balance Holder" in Aydın, Turkey at the Threshold..., pp. 63, 67. 10 Lesser, Bridge or Barrier, p. 1, Criss, "International Institutions...", p.
204; Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier?...", p. 67.
Doubts About NATO
The best option among the present available altematives for guaranteeing Turkey's security is to remain a full member of NATO with an emphasis on the Atlantic link within this alliance. Turkey's membership of NATO is a symbol of her participation in the VVestern democratic club, enhancing Western interest in Turkey and giving her a greater voice in international affairs and a seat in the highest councils of the West.
11 NATO also provides Turkey multilateral Euro-Atlantic framevvork for her defence cooperation vvith the West and thus rcduces her ovcr-reliance on the US. Somctimes Turkey sharcs vvith Europe the concerns about the US patronage in international events, the ambiguity of US commitments and unilatcral US initiatives launched vvithout consultations vvith other members. 12 Hovvever, the European states cannot replace America as the main security partner of Turkey because they lack rcsources and the intention to help Turkish defence efforts.
Turkish rulers expect that under the nevv NATO, "collective defence should stay, for it not only undcrpins... [Turkey's] fundamcntal security but it is also the basis, on vvhich... [Turkey's] commitmcnt rests." 13 The US and NATO should deter Russia and other potcntial enemies in a real sense and should avoid to act in the vvay that might lcad Russia and other potcntial enemies in the region to think that NATO's commitmcnt to Turkey's security is not genuine.
14 Hovvever, doubts about the solidity of the NATO commitmcnt to Turkish security cannot be removed from the minds of Turkish leaders easily. As NATO goes through an adaptation process, the possibility of NATO's negleeting Article 5 commitments to the defence of its members, especially in the case of an out-of-area issue seems likcly. Turkish rulers were certainly alarmed when they heard the debates about the "grey area" threats that might require more conditional guarantees. Turkish anxieties were reinforced during the Gulf War when some NATO allies responded to the Turkish request for assistance and reinforcement reluctantly and tardily. 15 Lesser points out that one important way of dispelling Turkish doubts about the solidity of the NATO guarantee and the emergence of a "grey area" debate is the maintenance of a permanent land-based U.S. tactical air presence (the 401 st Tactical Fighter Wing) in the Southern Region of NATO. Turkish rulers have seen this force as the evidence of a continued Alliance commitmcnt to the security of Turkey. 16 In fact, NATO established the AMF (ACE Mobile Force) in 1960 in order to come rapidly to the aid of NATO states in the flanks. This force had been carrying out field training exercises in eastern Turkey and in Turkish Thrace.
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Some criticisms that were made in the past on Turkey's role in shaping the defence strategies of NATO might also be valid currently. According to these views, the US determines and directs general policies of the alliance by ignoring special priorities of other members. Turkey's security needs require taking extra measures in addition to the policies determined by the US. Turkey's capability of action is limited with the goals of NATO to the extent that it cannot even make tactical changes in its security strategies decided by NATO's main powers. The US feels free to consider intervening in Turkey's surrounding region for its national interests, harming Turkey's geo-strategic relations with the regional countries. Westcrn powers do not show sensitivity toward Turkey's improving its defence structure, vvidening its security resources and options and adopting itself to the region's realities. 18 Turkey has contributed to the Western security beyond its capacity by remaining faithful to its alliance rcsponsibilities in contrast to the attitude of some members. It has played a vital role in the 15 Lesser creation of the perfect conditions prevailed throughout the central region by making great sacrifices such as alienating itself from its neighbours. 19 Turkish rulers now expect understanding for their efforts of diversifying Turkey's security resources, getting more aid and not provoking their neighbours. 20 If their doubts on the uncertainty of the future role of NATO cannot be eradicatcd, they will naturally have more interest in the emerging European defence arrangcmcnts and will seek different alternatives to strengthen their position vis-â-vis the West. 
Future of NATO
NATO officials frcqucntly emphasise that they have committed themselves to a robust "open door" policy concerning further accessions. 22 At the Madrid Summit, NATO povvers dccidcd to invite Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks. Turkish authorities are interested in this development because it is closely related to their wishes of occupying a central position in new defence and political structures of the Wcst. They have some reservations in supporting the enlargement of NATO. The internal and external adaptation proccss should not impair the cffectiveness and essential defensive role of NATO and the alliance should continue to be the main defence strueture and political consultation forum of the West.
23
The enlargement should be a gradual process and should be carricd out in conjunction with the Partnership for Peace project, not to alienate but to attract Russia to the Westem defence system. 24 If Moscow is left outside and is led to adopt a heavyhanded approach towards eastern European countries that have expressed a desire to join NATO, then it is inevitable to turn to power politics for spheres of influence, especially in the region surrounding Turkey. 25 The ultimate goal of NATO is to preserve the collective defence and the stability of its mcmbers and to establish an EuroAtlantic region where peace is the central feature and resort to military force is banished. 26 Hovvever, there seems to be differences between Europe and the US in establishing defence struetures concerning Europe and the surrounding regions. Some Europeans think that NATO is outdated and it should be put aside by giving more roles to other organisations such as the Organisation of Security Coopcration in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). In their views, NATO could be maintained, to be called for help in the case of an outside aggression, but it should be transformed away from being a vehicle for US involvement and domination in European security affairs. 27 The Bosnian conflict embarrassingly showed that the US and Europe sharcd very little sense of valucs, vision and political will.
28 While Europe wants to keep NATO by diminishing its financial burdens and seems to be unvvilling to acccpt the burden of a direct exposure in regions such as the Middle East, the US prefers to keep NATO strong and asks the Europeans to shoulder more burden for the Western defence. 29 The US is insistent on seeing the Westem security in the trans-regional basis, which is also supported by Turkey. Western statesmen think that the instabilities and conflicts originated outside the NATO area threaten Western security, requiring NATO rcspond to them effectively by undertaking nevv responsibilities and missions such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and crisis management. 31 Especially the US think that the area vvhich NATO needs to reach passes beyond its borders. For example, it considers NATO's southern flank extending until the Gulf region beyond Turkey's borders. Hovvever, the European states and Turkey do not see the link as clearly as the Americans do. They hesitate in accepting the extension of NATO's responsibility automatically to the regions outside the NATO area. Whilc Turkey considers the dcfcncc of its eastern and southern borders totally inside the NATO responsibility, it approaches to the expansion of the NATO arca cautiously. 32 Although ready to discuss the out-of-area issues vvithin NATO, Turkey does not vvant to undertake automatic responsibility to provide military force and to allovv the use of its territory in developments outside the NATO area. Turkish rulers vvill not join the out-of-arca operations unless ali NATO allies agreed to do so or unless they see joining the operation as vitally important for Turkish interests. 
Future of the European Security
The common European intention of having more voice in its defence and saving itself from the American domination is proved by the efforts to strengthen the Western European Union as the defence organ of the European Union. The Maastrich Treaty of 1991 considered the WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to overeome the objeetions. 34 Meanvvhile, in order not to alienate the Europeans from NATO, a European Security and Defence Idcntity (ESDI) has been established vvithin the Atlantic Alliance. 35 The Amcrican administration has genuinely supported making NATO a two-pillar alliance by welcoming the emergence of Europe as a more autonomous and responsible actor. 36 But it has also shared the concern of NATO's flank countries such as Turkey, Denmark and Nonvay that the small group of the WEU countries may contribute to instabilities in a wider region by concentrating only on their geo-strategically narrow, selfish defence needs. 37 These states assert that American political, economic and security interests are too closely intertvvined with those of Europe and the problems involving a wider region are too complex to permit the Americans to leave the Europeans struggling to copc with wide range issues.
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Especially Turkey share with the US the concern about the possibility of Europe's competing with the USA on the defence area. In the view of both sides, "NATO must remain the main forum for consultations among the Allies on issues concerning the security and defence of Europe. This is required not only because the transatlantic link is vital for European security, but also since NATO is the only forum whcre ali European allies enjoy equal cıpportunities and rights on matters of common concern." 39 The fact that "the ally furthest to the East geographically [Turkey] is the one quite often most worricd and most concerned about preserving the connections with the allies to the West [the USA, Canada] attracts attention." 40 Howevcr, Turkish officials also state that they support the Europeans' taking more responsibility for their own defence, the improvement of ESDI and WEU's bridge role betvveen the EU and NATO. Their condition is that Turkey should be accedcd to the security dimension of the EU, saving it form associating itself with decision taken elsewhere. They assert that "in order to make a meaningful contribution to ESDI, Turkey has to be ineluded in the policy formulation phase within the EU's Turkey also needs the American help in its problems with the Europeans. The European powers tend to consider Turkey as a peripheral strategic partner and as a strategic and political liability because of its complex and immediate problems. They think that they can get the help of Turkey in the event of a Middle Eastern crisis without giving it a full membership and they do not want to accept the burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East. The Europeans are more likely to see Turkey as a barrier to turmoil and military threats outside Europe rather than as an agent for dialogue in relation to security problems in the Middle East. 42 The diversification of interest areas and security priorities reduces the possibility of defcnce cooperation betvveen Turkey and the EU. 43 The European refusal of integrating Turkey into WEU is considered by Turkish leaders as an unvvillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security role on the continent. 44 The inelusion of Grccce to, and the exclusion of Turkey from the European security umbrella have important repercussions for Turkey's defence and security. Turkish leaders, conccrn that Greece will have great advantages vvith its full membership in WEU över Turkey and the stability and balance in the Aegean vvill be harmed seriously. In order to overeome the Turkish vvorries on the WEU guarantee for Greece against Turkey, it has been declared that the automatic guarantee in the Article fıve of WEU vvill be applied only against aggrcssion by non-members of NATO and not to internal disputes vvithin the alliance. 45 But Greece stili has the upper hand by at least feeling the support of the Europeans in its behind. 41 Orhun, "Turkey, Norvvay...", p. 10; Beyaz Kitap, p. 28. 42 
Enlargement of the European Union
It seems that the proposed enlargement of the EU vvill inelude central and eastern European countries but exclude Turkey. Thinking their institution as a stable and promising vvorld actor, the Europeans do not vvant to share borders vvith Iran, Iraq and Syria, vvhich produce instabilities continuously. 53 Unlike the US, European states seem to give priority to the demoeratisation before the stability. The role of the Turkish army, vvhich has been the strongest point of contact for NATO and the USA vvith Turkey, cannot be denied, but Westcrn Europeans "find the role of the Turkish armcd forces in the Turkish state system... quite out of keeping vvith Western practice".
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On the other hand, Turkish authorities sometimes do not hesitate to say that the exclusion of Turkey from the EU "vvould not be as vital for Turkey as some people think it vvould be, because Turkey has other options." 55 Turkey is especially worried that Europe will continue to be biased toward Greece on the Turkish-Greek problems and the Cyprus issue, thus Turkish-EU relations will become captive to Greek initiatives. It believes that the enlargement of the EU without Turkey will decrease the possibility of a solution of Turkish-Greek problems.
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The fact that the Turkish economy is essentially tied to Europe has been formalised with the customs union between Turkey and the EU. Turkey necds the EU membership not to be marginalised, not to weaken its position against Greece, to be less dependent on the US and to have a greater freedom of action in regional and global affairs. 58 It is very important for Turkey that the US will not try to detach her from the EU, but it will support gcnuincly its initiatives of being a part of Europe.
Relations with Russia
In order to keep their traditional enemy (Russia) under the control of the multilateral Westcrn security structures in the postCold War era, Turkish authorities pay a special attention to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PİP) projcct, vvhich will serve this purpose. 59 In their view, the enhanced PfP is not a consolation prize, but it is a mcans through vvhich "a sense of security and a sense of belonging are projected" to NATO's partners and vvhich facilitate the involvement of these partners in NATO's decision-making processes. Turkish officials further suggest that relations betvveen NATO, Russia and Ukraine should be formalised in politically binding documents and that these partners should not have the right to veto the decisions of NATO. 60 To prove the sincerity of their support for the PfP, they have suggested expanding it through joint military exercises and training opportunities betvveen Turkey and the Russian Federation.
61 They have established a PfP Training Centre in Ankara, finalised the project of establishing a multinational peace force in south-eastern Europe vvith the participation of ali regional NATO and PfP nations 62 and vvelcomed the American suggestion of establishing nevv forms of coopcration vvith the partner countries, namely the Atlantic Partnership Council.
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey have no common border vvith Russia and it does not have to fear direct exposure to the political and military povver of its giant neighbour. 64 Nevertheless, it seems that the tvvo states are being engaged in a stiff competition. Russia is the strongest force in the region and, through its heavy-handed approach tovvard the regional countries, gives the impression that it stili pursues povver politics to expand its sphercs of influence. Russia's efforts to control developments in the region elash vvith Turkey's perception of itself as the principal link betvveen Asia and Europe. 65 It is spcculated that Turkey might be among the primary targets of Russian nuclear vveapons vvhich have been de-targeted from civilian and military centres in the US. The extcnsion of Russian nuclear umbrella to ali the member countries of the Collective Security Treaty can be interpreted as a veilcd vvarning to Turkey on its efforts of establishing elose economic and political links vvith the former republics of the Soviet Union. 66 Russia also has refused to reduce the military conccntrations on its southcrn flank as required by the CFE Treaty of 1990 and signed treaties vvith some rivals of Turkey such as Armenia and Greece. It stili remains Syria's main military supplier and diplomatic ally and sees Iran as its strategic 60 Orhun, "Turkey, Norvvay...", pp. 10, 11-12; Orhun, "The Uncertainties...", p. 28. partner. The Russian attempt of selling sophisticated arms and missiles to Greek Cypriots was intcrpreted as a direct threat against the Turkish security. The establishment of Confederation of Kurdish Organisation of the CIS in Moscow on 1 November 1994 and the meeting of the third session of the Kurdish parliament-inexile on 19 October 1995 in a building attached to the Russian Duma vvere also irritating for Turkish leaders. 67 The more alarming for Turkey is that the Europeans and Americans are inclined to bc optimistic about developments in Russia and they do not see Russia as much threat as Turkey sees. It seems possible that the West may give a relatively free hand to Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia and may tolerate its violating the CFE Treaty limits in exchange for Russia's lcaving the Baltic states to the Wcst and not causing any problems in the enlargcmcnt of NATO. 68 Indccd, Turkish authoritics rcally fearcd earlier on that the US might build a partnership vvith Russia's nevv imperial designs. Some Turkish politicians belicvcd that the US contributed to the consolidation of the Russian influence in the region by ignoring the nevv Russian imperialism. 69 The US administration seemed to support Russian leaders in spite of their bold aetions because of their fcars that more havvkish leaders might have come to povver in Russia. 70 Novv, hovvever, it seems that the US shares increasingly more conccrns vvith Turkey on the assertion of the Russian influence in the Central Asia and the Caucasus vvith the possibility of gaining control of the energy rcsources in the region, and on Russia's coopcration vvith anti-Wcstern states such as Iran. 71 The agreement on maintaining Ukraine's indcpendcncc to check the Russian cxpansionism is onc example of the convcrgence of US and Turkish interests. Turkey's position is novv more secure in the region. The US gives increasingly more support to Turkish initiatives and the Russia is less effcctive. Russia's heavy-handed approach toward some former Soviet republics has led these states to try to balance the Russian force by expanding their ties with other countries including Turkey and the USA. 
Implementation of the CFE Treaty
The CFE Treaty, signed in 1990 and came to effect in 1992, stemmcd originally from the vicw that a stable and secure balance of conventional forces should be cstablished in Europe, where the former Warsaw Pact had supcriority in numbers of ground forces. The CFE Treaty has now been considcred as cornerstone of the stability and security of Europe. 73 Turkey attributes importance especially to the flank regime of the CFE Treaty, according to vvhich the signatories vvill not be able to concentrate military equipment and vveapons on the flank of Europe and vvill not be able to cxceed the sub-regional ccilings determincd by the Treaty. 74 Though Turkey is a party to the CFE Treaty, it has managed to kccp its southeastcrn region, bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran, outside it. Hovvever, Turkish rulers vvorry that the vvithdravval of former Soviet forces from the central Europe to behind the Urals in accordance vvith the CFE Treaty is expected to leave Turkey in an unfavourable position both vvithin NATO and against Russia. 75 Turkish rulers are also concerned on the Russian refusal of reducing military concentrations on its southern flank 76 Turkey, on the oher hand, makes it clear that it does not want the CFE Treaty changed in favour of Russia, asserting that it will cause a great disequilibrium in favour of Russian forces in the Caucasus and the Central Asia, resulting in return of the Cold War conditions. 79 This thinking has been proved by the Russian activism such as the stationing its troops in Armenia and Georgia. 
The Iraqi Problem
The general Turkish view on Iraq is that Iraq's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity should be preserved and Iraq should comply fully with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. 81 While the US remains focused on removing Saddam from power and challenges Iraq's territorial integrity with its policies, Turkey does not want to see Iraq destroyed and divided, fearing that this would destabilise the balance of power in the region and contribute to the expansion of the Iranian influence.
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Occasional Turkish attempts aimcd at easing Baghdad's political and economic isolation and strengthening its territorial integrity (such as holding tripartite meetings with Iran and Syria) are bound to create uneasiness in Washington. territorial integrity. 84 In the view of Bülent Ecevit, the US is the most responsible state for the division of Iraq because it has deliberately prevented the democratisation and territorial integrity of Iraq 85 in order to establish an Iraqi rule friendly vvith the USA or to vveaken Iraq in the region for US and Israeli interests.
The American-led embargo against Iraq and the closure of the Yumurtalık-Kirkuk oil pipeline are other sore points in Turkey's relations vvith the USA, causing the loss of billions of dollars to Turkey from trade vvith Iraq, and tourism and vvar-related expenditures. It is not only considered a loss of fairly high income but also a threat to Turkey's national interests. 86 The US vvorked to raise international support to compensate Turkey's economic losses caused by the Gulf Crisis. The UN Security Council resolution 986 has reopened the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline partially, providing Iraq vvith the limited opportunity to export oil in return for purchasing food, medicine and fundamental humanitarian goods. Hovvever, Turkish rulers stili feel that these limited relieves are too minör to compensate Turkey's losses. 87 The security consequences of the Gulf crisis for Turkey are much more difficult to compensate. The insurgency in the southeastera Turkey vvas deepened. Turkey had to spend more resources to contain the increasing terrorist activities and had to intervene in the Iraqi territory, vvhich resulted in its isolation in Western forums. It also needed to consider reactions of the Western povvers, especially the USA, not to damage the basic links on vvhich the overall Turkish foreign and security policy depends. 88 When Turkey left contingents in northern Iraq after its operations, it vvas interpretcd as that it intended to create a buffer zone in the area, desiring in the long-term to control the oil-rich Iraqi provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk. The interventions also had the effect of dragging Turkey into the Iraqi quagmire and unresolved conflicts 84 
The Kurdish Question
The Kurdish question seemed at one point the biggest problem of Turkey, having negative effects on its other problems as vvell. Turkish rulers found it difficult to understand the apparent support given by the European states to the separatist Kurdish organisation (PKK) under the auspices of human rights and political solution. 92 As the Kurdish uprising and the oppression of the Kurds by the Iraqi regime in the aftermath of the Gulf War attracted the attention of international public opinion to the plight of the Kurds in Turkey as vvell, Turkey's neighbours had a clear opportunity to exploit Turkey's problems vvith the PKK. It is widely believed in Turkey that if the safe heaven project was not implemented, Turkey would have managed to stop the activities of the PKK much earlier. The project allegedly allovved the PKK terrorists to improve their activities to the extent that in the seven-month period they reached the point that they could have reached in 30 years otherwise. 99 Benefiting from the presentation of the Kurdish question by the world press, PKK activists increased their influence vis-â-vis the Western powers and strengthened their prestige in the eyes of Kurdish people. Meanwhile, Turkish public opinion gradually came to belive that the US tried to use the international force only for its own interests, namely giving a severe lesson to Iraq's 'dictator', Saddam Hussain. The Americans had obtained a good opportunity to control and irritate the Iraqi administration; they would not easily give up this tool even after they reached the original aim (the protection of the Iraqi Kurds). In this thinking, the use of the İncirlik airbase by the Americans stayed no longer inside the original purposes. 100 Bülent Ecevit went even further in criticising the international force by claiming that Western powers would use the military force, stationed on the Turkish territory, against Turkey rather than Iraq. 101 In the view of some Turkish observers, the international force became a symbol of the fact that Turkey could not take decisions on its own because it had no genuine economic and political independence.
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There was a great concern in Turkey on harmful effects of the international force. Allegedly, the increase in the number of civilian American and British personnel in the region meant the increase in the intelligence operations of these states. 107 It seems that developments surrounding the Kurdish issue vvill likely to continue to be a sore point in Turkish-American relations.
Turkey's Problems with Greece
Turkey sees Greece as one of the most important dangers to its security and prepares its defence doctrine accordingly as proved by the existence of its "Aegean Army". 108 The main concern of Turkish authorities regarding Greece is to prevent it from breaking the balance in the Aegean established by 
Future Expectations
Turkey's Strategic importance
Turkish leaders are eager to make Turkey an integral part of the West. Staying outside the Western camp is not an option for them. In order to strengthen the Western interest in Turkey, they emphasise its strategic importance for the West. Turkey is the only democratic and secular Müslim country in the Middle East, maintaining its basic goal of the full integration vvith the West. It might play a bridge-building role in a region of considerable geopolitical complexity and serve as a democratic, secular and free enterprising role model for the regional states.
114 In Demirel's vvords, "by her very existence, Turkey could be a model for her neighbours to plant the seeds of secular democracy."
115 It also 112 Campbell, "The Superpovvers...", p. 67. 113 Lesser, Bridge orBarrier, p. 23. 114 Celal Göle, "Welcome Address" in Aydın, Turkey at the Threshold, p. 3; Gürel, "A General Appraisal...", pp. 12, 14; Demirel; "Turkey and NATO...", pp. 8-9; Solana, "NATO...", p. 21. 115 Demirel, "Turkey and NATO...", p. 9.
constitutes the most important barrier preventing the export of radical religious movements to the West and neutralising the effect of Iran's theocratic government model. 116 Some European observers consider the Turkish democracy defective and identify some Middle Eastern elements in Turkish politics. It is also argued that the Kemalist secular model for Müslim countries as a form of governance is less effective and attractive, considering the traditional hatred of the Arabs toward Turkey. 117 However, particularly the American administration continues to stress Turkey's model role. Meanwhile, Turkey's effort of improving its democracy and human rights records will increase its prestige in the eyes of the Europeans and the Americans and will place its relations with the West on a more stable ground.
With its geographic location, Turkey is able to serve both as a bridge and barrier on critical sea, land and air routes, reaching the world's vital natural resources, and affecting developments in nearby regions such as the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. 118 With its massive land, Turkey might resist the military attacks launchcd against the West in its strategic depth. It can mobilise a considerable number of soldiers and keep them ready to fıght for a long time. Turkey is eager to help the West in facing many dangers such as regional wars, terrorism, drug smuggling, and organised erime.
119 In Demirel's words, "through her aetions, fostering economic and political interdependence and cooperation, Turkey will not only remain central to the security and prosperity of the West, but will also be the key state in the containment and resolution of a host of problems of our era." 120 In Orhun's view, "Turkey has been on of the majör providers of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic era, rather than being a net consumer."
121 By maintaining its alliance with Turkey, the West thus ensures that the balance in a strategic region is formed to its advantage and the stability is maintained in its flanks.
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Turkey's ability to control the sea traffıc from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through its Straits is another important factor vvhich has the potential of affecting the balances in the region. 123 Turkey's strategic importance will thus continue to be the most important base of Turkish-American relations.
Turkey's Nevv Assertive Foreign and Security Policies
Turkey and the Balkans
Turkey is increasingly more concerned about developments in the Balkans and during the Balkan crises, staying under the influence of public opinion, the Turkish governments demanded more forceful aetions against Serbia. Hovvever, Turkish rulers also had to consider the possibility of outbreak of a general war encompassing the vvhole Balkans and had to balance their policies not to annoy the Western povvers, vvhich might accuse them of claiming rights in the former tcrritories of the Ottoman Empire.
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The American administration vvas particularly disturbed by the criticism of the non-intervention of the West in Bosnia by the Turkish people, giving the signal that an assertive Turkish attitude might elash vvith the American interests in the region. Consequently, Turkey chose to try to affect developments in the Balkans in the context of multilateral struetures such as NATO vvithout taking bold unilateral aetions. 125 As a sign of the importancc that it gives to the security cooperation in the Balkans, Turkey has made mutual arrangements vvith its neighbours based on the Security Building and Incrcasing Measures. 126 
Turkey and the Middle Eastern Countries
Turkey traditionally is in favour of having elose relations vvith the Arab and Müslim vvorld and vvants to solve its problems vvith the Middle Eastern states to strengthen its security. 128 Apart from having mutually benefıcial trade relations vvith the regional states, 129 Turkey attributes importance to the establishment of security and stability in the Persian Gulf together vvith preventing the domination of one povver in the region. 130 It avoids taking any side in Middle Eastern conflicts and tries not to antagonise regional countries vvhile cooperating vvith the West in the security area.
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Even if it is attracted to some regional issues and interaetions, Turkey avoids institutionalising its ties vvith the region. President Özal's efforts of having excessive role during and after the Gulf Crisis attracted criticism and did not bring Turkey expected benefits.
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While the US points to the global character of Middle Eastern crises and expects from its ali Western allies respond in the same vvay, Turkish rulers do not vvant to pursue aetive policies on 127 behalf of the West and to involve in US-led Western interventions in the region. They fear that Western interventions will draw Turkey to military conflicts outside its will and damage its relations with the regional states.
133 Turkish authorities do not want to undertake a general responsibility on behalf of the US in the Middle East, but they prefer to analyse the situation in each case to decide whether they join the American initiative.
134 They are also not sure that the increase in the presence of the US in the region will promote the peace. The support given by the US to some authoritarian regimes of the region might harm sensitive balances and cause conflicts. Moreover, the American efforts of trying to contain Iran and Iraq and using pressure tactics against Syria might bring about clashes betvveen Turkey and these states.
135
Turkish offıcials have similar ideas in many political and economic issues of the Middle East vvith the Europeans rather than the Americans. Nevertheless, they need to cooperate vvith the USA because of common security and strategic concerns.
136 They vvant to keep developments under control by pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence vvhereas the Americans do not hesitate to resort to forceful measures. In spite of American calls for implementing embargo against Iran, Turkey has made a natural gas agreement vvith this state for a 23-year period. 137 The American administration's soft attitude tovvard Syria, aimed at dravving this state to the Middle Eastern peace process, does not please Turkey. There vvere rumours that the Americans consider the use of Turkish vvater resources by Syria in return for leaving the vvater resources in the Golan Heights to Israel. 138 On the other hand, unlike the Europeans, the American administration assures Turkish rulers on Turkey's vital strategic importance for the West in the Middle Eastern context. On the Palestinian problem, Turkey sees the US as the only country which could guide the sides for a solution and supports US-led peace process for the sake of regional security. Turkish rulers put emphasis on granting the selfdetermination right to the Palestinians and on the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, promise to provide fınancial aid to the Palestinian administration, but they do not want involving in the process closely.
139
Turkey and the Central Asian Countries
Some prominent Turkish politicians speak of a large unifıed Turkic world, stretching from the Chinese Wall to the Adriatic. They thought in early 1990s that a political and economic unity could be established among the Turkic states under the leadership of Turkey even if a tight political organisation could not be formed. This gave the impression that Turkey might depart from its traditional conservative foreign policy line. 140 Hovvever, Turkish efforts of inserting its model in the region implied a big brother attitude that was hurting for the regional states. Turkish rulers realised soon that the idea of establishing a strong Turkic union was not a viable alternative. The Central Asian states were unstable and demanded much more military and economic aid than that Turkey could give. Although they seemed very close to Ankara, it was proved that they could turn to Moscow easily in vital economic, political and security issues. What they preferred was a loose grouping which held summit meetings occasionally. Turkey might help them mostly by serving as an agent in getting the capital, technology and friendship of the West. 141 Meanwhile, irritated by Turkey's activities, Russia tried to reinsert its influence in the Central Asia, made special arrangements with the regional states, and even resorted to the military force. 142 The Americans seemed at that time to consider the region in the realm of the Russians. Only after Russia faced vvith great difficulties in establishing its influence, Amcrican leaders began to think that helping Turkey in increasing its influence in the region might be to the advantage of the US. 143 In the eyes of the Americans, Turkey might affect the regional states in shaping their system in accordance vvith democratic and secular models. With the help of having the same language and religion, Turkey could prevent or at least limit the expansion of the Russian and Iranian influences in the Central Asia. 144 Turkish rulers emphasise that they can help Western initiatives in the region and undertake the leadership role in tying the Central Asia to the West through technical, economic and fınancial aids. 145 As the US shovvs more interest in the region and the regional countries expect US help, Turkey maintains close contact vvith both sides to help their relations and attributes special importance to the participation of the Central Asian and Caucasian states to the PfP project in this context. It takes the lead in the summit meetings of the Turkic states and joins economic projects and encourages its private companies in these countries. Helping the regional states in this vvay to reduce their dependence on Russia vvill be helpful for both Turkey and the US. 146 In the last analysis, Turkey's relations vvith the Central Asian countries are not altemative to Turkey's ties vvith the West, but they could bc seen as the means for strengthcning these ties vvith their original aim of attracting attention to the fact that Turkey is an indispensable ally of the West.
147
Another important issue for Turkey in the Central Asian context is to ensure that the region's oil and gas vvill reach to the Western markets through the Turkish territory. At the beginning, Turkey wanted ali oil pipelines pass through its territory. 148 However, with the intervention of the US, vvhich do not vvant to alienate the Russians totally, Turkey accepted that oil could be tıransferred through multiple pipelines, meaning that some other states such as Russia, too, could get benefit from the transportation of oil. 149 In the eyes of Turkish rulers, "the project tabled by Turkey to transport oil from the vast reserves of the Caspian basin through a main pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan vvill have significant consequences for the prosperity of the entire region... Turkey offers a viable, reliable, rantable, technologically and environmentally most feasible and safe option." 150 The transportation of oil through Russia means that the tanker traffic in the Turkish Straits vvill increase greatly, causing environmental problems for Turkey. Turkish rulers have obtained the support of some regional states such as Azerbaijan for the Baku-Ceyhan project. Hovvever, the majör povvers of the vvorld, including oil companies, have more voice in taking the final decision. Therefore, Turkish leaders attribute great importance to the support of the US in this matter. 151 The US and Turkey agrees on that the Azeri oil should be saved from the monopoly of Russia and that Iran and Russia should not be allovved to have an influential voice in the transportation of oil.
152
Turkish-Israeli Relations
The recent improvcments in Turkish-Israeli relations sürengthen Turkey's relations vvith the US and increase its importance in the eyes of the Americans. The Turkish-Israeli defence coopcration agrecments in February and August 1996 symbolised the introduetion of the security aspect to the relations bstvveen the tvvo states. According to the agreements, the air forces and the navy of the tvvo states vvould carry out joint military 148 153 Turkish Defence Minister Turhan Tayan's visit to the Golan Heights in May 1997 vvas a brave action. In return, Israeli Prime Minister Netenyahu criticised the idea of the establishment of a Kurdish state and condemned the separatist PKK organisation for the first time in his intervievv vvith a Turkish television. In spite of the intensive protests of the regional states, Turkish, American and Israeli navies performed the planned joint military excrcise in January 1998. As stated by Israeli Minister Moshe Arens, the Turkish-Israeli military axis is the most important development of the recent Middle Eastern history, having the potential to change the regional balance of povver. The fear of the Arabs that the Western povvers and their regional allies might establish an anti-Arab coalition has been renevved. Syria has activated the Arab vvorld against the nevv development and has obtained the political support of the Arab states to break its isolation. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria have formed a strategic partnership and Iran has vvon important successes in getting recognition of the Middle Eastern countries. 154 Responding to reactions, Turkish authorities assert that the Turkish-Israel cooperation is not against any regional state but contributes to the establishment of peace, stability and order in the region.
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Turkish leaders see their cooperation vvith Israel as an alternative to be used in the case the Western povvers cause problems. While the European countries and the US seem unreliable in providing vveapons because of their heavy conditions, Israel has become an alternative for Turkey, diminishing its dependence on the West and diversifying its defence sources. 153 Mufti, "Daring and Caution...", pp. 35-36, 47-48, 154 Gresh, "Turkish-Israeli...", pp. 189-190, 193-194, 203. 155 Gürel, "A General Appraisal...", pp. 20-21; Beyaz Kitap, p. 35.
Turkey might get from Israel weapons and military technology that will never be able to get from the US and the European countries. In 1996 the Israeli companies undertook half a billiondollar project of the modernisation of Turkey's 54 F-14 vvarplanes. In December 1997, the modernisation of Turkey's 48 F-5 vvarplanes was given to Israel. Turkey and Israel also agreed on the joint manufacture of Arrow missiles. 156 In the light of the serious increase in the military armament in the region, Israel seems a valuable partner, helping Turkey to defend itself against ballistic missiles. The cooperation with Israel has also provided important opportunities to Turkey in limiting the power of Syria, Iraq and Iran.
157 Hovvever, the most important motive of Turkish rulers in improving their relations with Israel is to strengthen their alliance relations with the US. They expect that the mighty Israeli lobby in America will affect the Congress in taking more pro-Turkish decisions in important issues such as the military sales, the Cyprus question and the allegations of Armenian massacres at the hands of the Ottomans.
158
The American administration clearly supports the TurkishIsraeli rapprochement. When Turkey and Israel decidcd to carry out joint military exercises, America expressed its vvorries only on its timing. After persuading the sides in changing its time, the US itself joined the exercise. The Americans suggested calling a Jordanian commander to the exercise seemingly to appease the Arab opposition or to expand the Turkish-Israeli cooperation to a Middle Eastern grouping. In the last analysis, Turkey needs to pursue a flexible policy by taking into consideration the possibilities that Israel might solve its problems with the Arabs and Turkish-Israeli relations might deteriorate. Such a development might decrease the importance of Turkey for the Americans in the Israeli context and might leave Turkey alone in facing the Middle Eastern povvers alienated by the Turkish-Israeli cooperation. 
Future of Turkish Foreign Policy
Turkish disappointment toward the Westem powers in some issues in the 1990s underlined the possibility that Turkey might seek a new identity outside the West and ne w roles in the Balkans and Turkic republics. In the view of Süleyman Demirel, the effectiveness and reliability of the Western organisations failed in the recent international crises. The prestige of Western values and ideas vvere sharply decreased in the eyes of Turkish people because they believed that the West shovved a biased attitude tovvard the oppressed Muslims of Bosnia, Chechnya and Kosova.
160
Turkish people also thought that Turkey vvas not accepted to the EU because of its Müslim identity. With the nevv developments, they felt that Turkey could not trust any more the West in getting benefits in economic, political and security areas. That strengthened the hand of the conservative and nationalist elements in Turkish politics, demanding closer relations vvith the Müslim and Turkic vvorld respectively. 161 Islamic-oriented Welfare Party thus became successful in the local and general eleetions by playing off "Turkey's economic, political and security turmoil vvith a nationalistic message of contempt for the West." its message found fertile ground among average Turks, vvho believed that the West let them dovvn on a number of vital issues central to Turkey's future. 162 While the centrist parties could not satisfy demands of the average person, the dynamic character of conservatives and nationalists hinted a radical shake up in the Turkish political life vvith its repercussions on Turkey's foreign policy. 163 The process has been interrupted by a series of initiatives launehed by the Turkish military, starting on 28 February 1997 and radical elements themselves have become pro-integration vvith the West. Hovvever, anti-Western feeling might also overeome Turkey's traditional elite as shovvn by Şükrü Gürel's statement that Turkey is 160 Turkey's close relationship vvith the West, including the US cannot be taken granted. The West has to be careful on not antagonising Turkey if it vvants to protect its ovvn interests. Turkish estrangement from the West is likely to make the process of political and economic change in Turkey more diffıcult and crisisprone. 165 Turkish rulers vvarn that the fail of Turkey to the hands of radical groups vvill affect Western security directly. Particularly the Turkish military has sought to attract the US support for Turkey's traditional line. "By designating Islamic fundamentalism as the enemy vvithin, [it] made itself part of the anti-Iranian strategy... By allying itself to Israel, it could be sure of strong support from the USA and the Congress." 166 Nevertheless, Turkish people's lack of confidence in the West continues and the centrist parties stili face heavy defeats in Turkish elections. Therefore, there are stili valid reasons for the Americans to vvorry on a possible change in the structure of Turkey's traditional ruling elite and its Western-oriented foreign policy line. Relying on the military in rnaintaining the traditional structure is both unreliable and contrary to democratic principles.
In the nevv atmosphere created after the end of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy alternatives have vvidely been discussed in pıublic in the vvay that cannot compared vvith the past and nevv proposals vvere put forvvard. The changes in Turkish domestic pıolitics and the affinity of the Turkish nation to the people in the crises regions have put pressures on the government to pursue more active foreign policies. As a result, the horizon of Turkey's foreign and security policies has broadened both regionally and functionally. Turkey is more active in the international crises, it protects its interests more assertively (such as its actions against Syria and its operations in northern Iraq) and the sensitivity of Turkish offıcials on Turkey's sovereignty is more prominent vvith the increasing Turkish nationalism. 167 Turkish rulers try to protect 164 Gürel, "A General Appraisal...", pp. 13, 21. 165 Lesser, "Turkey's Strategic Options", p. 88. 166 Gresh, "Turkish-Israeli...", p. 191. 167 Lesser, "Turkey's Strategic Options", pp. 80, 87, 88; Roper, "The West and Turkey...", p. 90.
their interests through the organisations such as the UN, NATO and OSCE, rather than emphasising bilateral relations with the countries such as the US. In Demirel's words, Turkey seeks;
to explore opportunities for political, economic, commercial, social and cultural joint initiatives in meeting daunting challenges by pursuing a multi-dimensional foreign policy. (,..)Turkey's strategic relevance in the post-Cold War era lies in her ability to look both to the west and the east; to remain firmly committed to her Western orientation while simultaneously recognising the complexities of her geography as well as the harsh realities of her immediate neighbourhood.
168
The establishment of the D-8 group among the Müslim states during the brief period of Erbakan's government symbolised an important change in Turkish foreign policy. But Erbakan had to leave the power because of the severe opposition to his government. In fact, Erbakan himsclf could not take contrary actions to the traditional policies concerning the membership in NATO, the relations vvith Israel and the customs union vvith the EU. Finally the economic crises in Asia reiterated the notion that the integration vvith the Müslim vvorld could not be an alternative to relations vvith the West. 169 Neverthclcss, Erbakan's successors have chosen to keep the D-8 in case they need it. Turkey's leading role in the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), too, is aimed at pursuing more aetive foreign policy. It enhances Turkey's influence in the region and contributes to its security by strengthening the peace in the surrounding region. But Turkish authorities frequently emphasise that their leadership role in the BSEC project is not an alternative to future membership in the EU. They state that their activities vvill serve the Western interests and vvill deepen Turkey's integration vvith the West. The support given by the US to this project, therefore, is valuable for Turkish rulers.
170
As a part of pursuing more independent foreign policy, Turkish rulers try to be self-suffıcient in dcfence. The impact of 168 Demirel, "Turkey and NATO...", p. 8. 169 Hunter, " Bridge or Frontier?...", p. 76; Lesser, "Turkey's Strategic Options", p. 87. 170 Hale, "Turkish Foreign Policy...", p. 244.
Military Assistance
With the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, it became clear that Turkey's importance for the USwould not decrease, but it was also realised that American aid to Turkey would not continue in the same level and way. The failure in getting more fınancial and military assistance from the US in spite of its faithfulness and cooperation inside NATO displcascd the Turks. 176 After the Gulf War, American aid to Turkey was increased from 553.4 million dollars to 635.4 million dollars, most of which was in the form of outright grants. With the inclusion of CFE-related equipment, Turkey vvould be recipient of US and German military equipment vvorth of 8 billion dollars. But this extraordinary increase resulted from the CFE treaty and special conditions of the Gulf War. The normal tendcncy vvas that the American Congress vvould be less enthusiastic in providing security assistance. Turkish rulers vvere also avvare that the Cyprus and Kurdish issues, the human rights violations and the Balkan conflicts vvould be debated during the foreign aid bili discussions. 177 When the American Congress suspendcd 10% of the 453 million-dollar aid on 29 July 1994 because of Turkey's failure in making improvements in its human rights records and the Cyprus issue, the Turkish government responded by refusing the part of the aid, vvhich vvas made conditional. This caused a serious cutback in the US supplementary vveapons and cquipment program, on vvhich Turkey relied heavily especially in its fight against the PKK.
178
Turkey's traditional vvays of receiving aid from the US have gradually disappeared and the aid, vvhich has been turned to a commercial arms sale, has been fılled by the Congress vvith outsider elements harming Turkish interests. Turkey buys vveapons from private Amcrican companies and reccives military cquipment from the US administration in the form of credits or grants (Foreign Military Sales, FMS). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the US provided aid to Turkey as FMS credits, Southern-Region Aid (SRA) and CFE-surplus vveapons, trying to reduce the effect of the Congress' limitations. By pointing to the SRA, American authorities cancellcd the grant-aid totally and turned it to interest-bearing FMS credits. The 450 million-dollar aid in 1993 vvas totally this kind. Owing to high interest rates, Turkey's debt payments exceeded in some years the actual amount of the socalled American aid and even reached the 10% of Turkey's total expenditures. There vvas no difference betvveen taking credits from a commercial bank and receiving military aid from the US any longer. The reduction of the FMS credits to 400 million dollars for 1995 vvith the 7% interest rate and its conditioning resulted in the loss of the attractiveness of the American security aid for Turkey. Meanvvhile, vvith the limitation of the commercial purchases vvith 10 million dollars, Turkey could not benefit from bargaining opportunities vvith private companies. Moreover, political disputes prevented the transfer of some US military equipment that vvas appropriated for Turkey. Consequently, it can be said that the limitations in the American aid negatively affect Turkey's security principles and priorities. Turkey's dependence on the US on logistics, maintenance and training limits Turkey's security alternatives. The American policy of allovving only limited technology transfer in military sales and joint projects sanctions Turkey's efforts to establish a stronger defence infrastructure. 
Turkish-American Strategic Partnership
Turkish authorities vvere not happy in the content and implementation of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) signed betvveen Turkey and the USA in 1980. They vvere of the opinion that the Americans did not fulfıl their responsibilities concerning the modernisation of the Tuıkish armed forces. Turkish leaders particularly demanded that the security relationship betvveen the tvvo countries should be saved from the outsider elements such as the Cyprus question and that the economic aspects of the DECA should be implemented satisfactorily. When their demands vvere not met, they became reluctant in the expansion of the defence cooperation vvith America though they allovved the extension of the DECA annually.
Hovvever, the Gulf Crisis provided a good opportunity for Turkey in proving its strategic importance for the West by cooperating vvith Washington closely. The Turkish government closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline immediately and allowed the use of its territory by the coalition forces. The alleged intention of President Özal by opening a second front against Iraq to annex Mosul and Kirkuk vvas not materialised because of severe domestic opposition. Nevertheless, the unhesitant help provided by Turkey for America in its hour of need during the vvar had vital importance. In this vvay, Turkey guaranteed its place vvithin the Western camp in the post-Cold War period. Ankara has never received compensation for its vvar losses in the amount vvhich it has expected, 180 but it has become one of majör strategic partners of the US by deepening its security relationship vvith it.
After the Gulf War, by extending the DECA in December 1991, Turkish authorities pre-empted in a sense the Americans' putting forvvard nevv demands concerning the use of the bases.
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In March 1993, the Turkish administration conveyed its demands again to the Americans on making changes in the DECA. In this vvay, the tvvo sides returned to the period of endless negotiations of 1980s vvith the extension of the agreement annually. Meanvvhile, the American decision to vvithdravv military personnel and nuclear vveapons in the Erhaç and Eskişehir air bases vvithout Consulting the Turkish side displeased Ankara. By the middle of 1994, ten out of tvvelve NATO bases in Turkey had been closed. The dissatisfaction of Turkish rulers on the DECA continued in the follovving years. They mainly vvanted America provide more help and transfer high military technology in developing Turkey's defence industry. 182 It vvas expected that the Turkish-American defence cooperation vvould not expand any longer in the 1990s. The Americans should have appreciated the cautious attitude of Turkish authorities on the use of Turkish airfield and military bases. Turkey vvould demand a more mature and diversifıed relationship in vvhich traditional security contacts vvere supported by more emphasised political and economic cooperation, benefiting both states. The nevv security initiatives concerning Turkey should have been materialised in a multilateral context and in a vvay that they vvould increase Turkey's importance for the West, they vvould be 180 Köni, "Gulf Savaşı..." pp. 48-49. 181 Lesser, Bridge or Barrier, p. 35. 182 Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives...", pp. 345-346, 347. goals in the new era such as "a) elevating global economic growth as a primary foreign policy goal; b) promoting the spread of democracy and free markets; c) updating American-led alliances created during the Cold War as well as working to revitalise and reform the United Nations; and d) updating America's security arrangements and armed forces to meet new threats and challenges, including a higher emphasis on peace-support operations." 186 The new tendencies in the American security thinking ("the rediscovery of geopolitics on Europe's periphery especially in the Caspian and grovving emphasis on the challenges of weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation and regional power projection") have resulted in America's shovving more interest in Turkey as a strategic partner. High-level American officials considcr Turkey as the new frontline country of NATO and one of the majör actors vvhich might affect developments in the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and Europe. 187 For Turkey, the US is the most suitable partner that can provide security guarantees in facing nevv threats. Turkish rulers aim at improving Turkish-American relations in the vvay that they vvill serve the mutual interests. They think that furthering the bilateral relationship vvhich is called as the "Improved Partnership" in the arcas of politics, defence cooperation, economy and energy vvill serve the regional and global peace and stability. 188 Finally, it has to be knovvn that being strategic partners and making strategic coopcration do not mean that Turkey and the US vvill have the same vievvs in every matter in a vvide region stretehing from the Balkans to the Central Asia.
